A strictly strategy-proof mechanism is one that asks agents to use strictly dominant strategies. In the canonical one-dimensional mechanism design setting with private values, we show that strict strategyproofness is equivalent to strict monotonicity plus the envelope formula, echoing a well-known characterisation of (weak) strategy-proofness. A consequence is that strategy-proofness can be made strict by an arbitrarily small modification, so that strictness is 'essentially for free'.
Introduction
Two popular notions of robustness in mechanism design are strategy-proofness and full implementation. The former requires that agents use weakly dominant strategies; the latter that every equilibrium leads to the desired outcome.
In applications, it is common to have the one without the other. Consider the canonical auction setting with valuations independently distributed on compact supports. The first-price auction has a unique Bayes-Nash equilibrium implementing the efficient allocation, 1 but agents' strategies are not weakly dominant. The second-price auction has an efficient equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies, but also has many other, inefficient, equilibria. 2 * We are grateful to Yi-Chun Chen, Eddie Dekel, Jeff Ely, Piero Gottardi, Matt Jackson, Bart Lipman, Alessandro Pavan, Marciano Siniscalchi and Asher Wolinsky for helpful comments.
1 Under mild distributional assumptions. See e.g. Lebrun (2006) . 2 For example: agent 1 always bids strictly above the supports of all agents' valuations, and all other agents always bid zero.
A sufficient condition for both kinds of robustness is strict strategyproofness: agents use strictly dominant strategies. Weak strategy-proofness obviously follows, and full implementation follows because a game can have at most one strictly dominant strategy profile.
In this note, we study strict strategy-proofness in a canonical onedimensional mechanism design setting with private values and quasi-linear and strictly single-crossing preferences. It is well-known that weak strategyproofness is equivalent to monotonicity plus the envelope formula; we show in §3 that strict strategy-proofness is equivalent strict monotonicity plus the envelope formula.
In §4, we derive the implication that any weakly strategy-proof mechanism is virtually strictly strategy-proof, meaning that it can be made strictly strategy-proof by an arbitrarily small modification. This can be viewed as a novel robustness property of weak strategy-proofness. It follows further that a principal designing a weakly strategy-proof mechanism can achieve strict strategy-proofness at arbitrarily small cost.
Environment
There is a principal and n agents. The principal chooses a physical outcome x i ∈ [0, 1] and a payment p i ∈ R for each agent i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. 3 We neglect for now any feasibility constraints that (x 1 , . . . , x n ) must satisfy. 
A direct mechanism is a map (X, P ) : 
(strictly) strategy-proof iff
for all i, t −i and r i = t i .
Strict strategy-proofness obviously implies weak strategy-proofness. By a standard revelation principle, any allocation rule (X, P ) that can be achieved as a weak (strict) dominant-strategy equilibrium of some mechanism must be weakly (strictly) strategy-proof. It is therefore without loss of generality to focus on weakly (strictly) strategy-proof direct mechanisms.
The following characterisation of weak strategy-proofness is well-known: 7
Spence-Mirrlees lemma. A direct mechanism (X, P ) is weakly strategyproof iff for each i and
is weakly increasing and the envelope formula is satisfied:
A characterisation of strict strategy-proofness
For strict strategy-proofness, we have the following natural analogue.
Proposition 1.
A direct mechanism (X, P ) is strictly strategy-proof iff for each i and t −i , X i (·, t −i ) is strictly increasing and the envelope formula is satisfied:
The proof hews closely to a standard proof of the Spence-Mirrlees lemma.
Proof. Begin with an observation: if the envelope formula ( ) holds, then the payoff loss of type t i of agent i from mimicking type r i , when the other 7 See e.g. Jehle and Reny (2011, Theorem 9.5) . For this result, it suffices that preferences be weakly single-crossing in the sense that g agents' (reported) types are t −i , is
The final step used Lebesgue's fundamental theorem of calculus, which is applicable since g i 2 is bounded. Suppose that (X, P ) is strictly strategy-proof. Then it is weakly strategyproof. Fix an i and a t −i . Since g i 2 is bounded, the envelope theorem of Milgrom and Segal (2002, Theorem 2) applies; hence the envelope formula ( ) must hold. Payoff losses from mimicking are therefore given by ( ). By strict strategy-proofness, ( ) is strictly positive for any r i = t i . Since g i 2 (·, s) is strictly increasing, this is only possible if X i (·, t −i ) is strictly increasing. 8 Suppose that (X, P ) is such that for each i and t −i , X i (·, t −i ) is strictly increasing and the envelope formula ( ) holds. Then payoff losses from mimicking are given by ( ). By inspection, ( ) is strictly positive for any r i = t i since g i 2 (·, s) and X i (·, t −i ) are strictly increasing; hence (X, P ) is strictly strategy-proof. Remark 1. Suppose that each agent i has a (type-independent) outside option worth w i . Then strict strategy-proofness plus (interim) individual rationality are equivalent to strict monotonicity, the envelope formula ( ), and g i (X i (0, t −i ), 0) − P i (0, t −i ) ≥ w i for each i and t −i . 
which is equivalent to
So it cannot be that both terms on the left-hand side are strictly positive. By ( ), this contradicts the hypothesis that t i strictly prefers not to mimic r i and vice-versa.
Strictness is essentially for free
Since any weakly increasing function is close to strictly increasing functions, Proposition 1 allows us to conclude that weak strategy-proofness can be made strict by an arbitrarily small modification. We require a pair of additional assumptions: for each i, the gross payoff g i (·, t i ) is continuous for each t i , and the family of type derivatives {g i 2 (·, t i )} t i ∈[0,1] is equi-continuous. 9,10 These assumptions are weak and typically satisfied in applications; for example, they hold for the gross payoff g i (x i , t i ) = x i t i commonly used in auctions.
Let X ⊆ [0, 1] n be the set of feasible physical outcomes, and call a mechanism (X, P ) feasible iff X(t) is feasible for every t ∈ [0, 1] n . For concreteness, assume that the feasible set is
which in the auction interpretation means that the good cannot be assigned with total probability exceeding unity. The argument below applies unchanged if the good must be assigned ( Proposition 2. If a feasible direct mechanism (X, P ) is weakly strategyproof, then for any ε > 0, there is a feasible and strictly strategy-proof direct mechanism that is uniformly ε-close to (X, P ). 11
In the language of the virtual implementation literature (e.g. Abreu and Sen (1991) , Abreu and Matsushima (1992) ), Proposition 2 says that every feasible and weakly strategy-proof direct mechanism is virtually strictly strategy-proof. Weak strategy-proofness therefore 'essentially' shares the robustness properties of strict strategy-proofness; in particular, an arbitrarily small modification suffices to achieve full implementation.
Proof. Let (X, P ) be feasible and weakly strategy-proof. We shall construct a feasible and strictly strategy-proof direct mechanism in terms of δ > 0, then show that we can make it uniformly ε-close to (X, P ) by choosing δ.
is equi-continuous iff for any ε > 0, there is a δ > 0 such that
for all t i may be weakened to continuity of g i (·, 0) only. But given the equi-continuity assumption, the latter implies the former, for g i (·, t i ) equals g i (·, 0) plus a continuous integral (using Lebesgue's fundamental theorem of calculus).
11 That is: for every i, t i and
For δ > 0, define a direct mechanism (X δ , P δ ) as follows. For each i,
In the auction interpretation, this physical allocation rule assigns the good according to X with probability 1 − δ, and with probability δ assigns it randomly with probabilities proportional to agents' types. This allocation rule is feasible since X is:
Since (X, P ) is weakly strategy-proof, X i (·, t −i ) is weakly increasing by the Spence-Mirrlees lemma; hence X i δ (·, t −i ) is strictly increasing. Define the payments to satisfy the envelope formula ( ):
Since strict monotonicity and the envelope formula hold, (X δ , P δ ) is strictly strategy-proof (for any δ > 0) by Proposition 1. For every i, t i and t −i , we have
Since X i maps into [0, 1], this expression is bounded by δ, so X i δ is uniformly δ-close to X i .
Since (X, P ) is weakly strategy-proof, it satisfies ( ) by the Spence-12 When the first term is 0/0, it is to be understood as 1/n.
The principal's objective function is typically continuous in applications. It often has the form
where F is the principal's belief about how types are distributed. Π is continuous for revenue-maximisation (π(x, p, t) = p), efficiency-maximisation (π(x, p, t) = xt), and welfare-maximisation (π(x, p, t) = xt − p).
Related literature
To our knowledge, strict strategy-proofness has appeared previously only in Bergemann and Morris (2009) . These authors characterise 'robust' implementability by a direct mechanism in terms of strict ex-post incentivecompatibility (strict EPIC), which is equivalent to strict strategy-proofness in a private-values environment such as ours. In §7, they consider an auction environment, and construct (in the same way as in the proof of Proposition 2) a strictly EPIC mechanism close to an efficient mechanism. Proposition 2 shows that with private values, this can be done for any weakly strategy-proof mechanism, not only efficient ones. Bergemann and Morris (2009) do not characterise strict strategy-proofness, so have no analogue of Proposition 1. As mentioned in §4, Proposition 2 may be viewed as contributing to the virtual implementation literature (e.g. Abreu and Sen (1991) , Abreu and Matsushima (1992) ). This literature does not appear to have considered 'strict' versions of incentive-compatibility.
More tangentially related are the literatures on undominated implementation (e.g. Jackson (1992) ) and rationalisable implementation (e.g. Bergemann, Morris and Tercieux (2011) ). The former requires that agents' strategies not be weakly dominated; the latter that they not be iteratively strictly dominated. By contrast, we require agents' strategies to be strictly dominant.
